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COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
CABLE TELEVISION: A CHANGING MEDIUM RAISES 
NEW LEGAL ISSUES 
Richard D. Harmon* 
Despite a growing amount of writing on the subject, misun-
derstandings about the cable television medium persist. Al-
though cable television's first amendment status is now widely 
recognized, 1 this status conflicts sharply with ingrained attitudes 
about cable television and the propriety of various local govern-
mental controls. . 
The federal courts, including a significant number of district 
courts located in the Ninth Circuit, are increasingly being asked 
to resolve these conflicts. The Ninth Circuit, however, has not 
yet considered the issues raised by cases such as Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.2 Before such considera-
tion occurs, it is appropriate to summarize the issues which are 
now emerging in the cable television context. 
Although the purpose of this article is to briefly outline cer-
tain questions of federal law relevant to cable television in the 
1980s, some attempt will also be made to correct misconceptions 
* Member, California Bar. Mr. Harmon is a partner with the Oakland, California 
law firm of Farrow, Schildhause, Wilson & Rains, and has represented several cablecas-
ters, including the plaintiff in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 
U.S. 40 (1982). 
1. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 
(10th Cir. 1981) ("Cable operators, like publishers and wireless broadcasters, are entitled 
to First Amendment protection." Id. at 1376). Altogether, there are five reported Boul-
der decisions. Hereinafter they will be referred to as follows: Boulder I (485 F. Supp. 
1035 (D. Colo. 1980)) is the first trial court injunction; Boulder II (630 F.2d 704 (lOth 
Cir. 1980)) is the 2-1 decision reversing Boulder I; Boulder III (496 F. Supp. 823 (D. 
Colo. 1980)) is the second trial court injunction; Boulder IV (660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 
1981)) left the second injunction in place, but augmented it, and remanded for a full 
trial; Boulder V (455 U.S. 40 (l982)) reversed Boulder II (the first Tenth Circuit 
decision). 
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about cablecasters.3 There are, of course, differing opinions re-
garding these factual issues, but an attempt to correct miscon-
ceptions is nonetheless warranted, since no analysis of the legal 
issues affecting contemporary cable television can ignore the 
current factual environment. Some background discussion thus 
precedes examination of various legal issues now before those 
federal courts in the Ninth Circuit where cable television litiga-
tion is pending. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING CABLE TELEVISION 
A. The Early Years: 1950-1970 
Early cable television developed in the 1950s as a means of 
filling in service gaps where off-air television signals did not 
reach .• Thus, in places where television was otherwise unavaila-
ble or reception was poor, an entrepreneur, by erecting an an-
tenna on a high elevation, could gather off-air television signals 
and deliver them for a fee to customers by use of a cable, to-
gether with simple amplifiers to boost the signals along the 
cable. These early cable television systems were literally commu-
nity antenna television services, or "CATV":' They were almost 
always small enterprises, conducted locally, and initially deliv-
ered little more than the three national network services which, 
it was generally assumed, were principally what viewers wanted. 
CATV, to the extent people thought about it at all, was 
viewed as a sort of a utility or, at the very least, as a service 
which did not have to be duplicated. Occasionally, cable televi-
sion companies were required to obtain utility-type "franchises" 
for a finite term. This response to CATV's "electrical wire" ap-
pearance went relatively unchallenged in the industry's infancy, 
and thus acquired an aura of legitimacy. Not all cities used a 
"franchise" mode, however. Simple non-exclusive permits or li-
censes were used, often annually renewable, and safe street use 
3. Some older authorities only use the term cablecasting in reference to such activi-
ties as origination of local programming, but the term is generally being adopted as a 
useful reference to anyone who uses cable television facilities to engage in first amend-' 
ment dissemination. This would even include retransmitting the programming of an-
other, just as newspapers clearly engage in first amendment activity when they carry 
UPI or AP wire stories. 
4. M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 5-6 (1979). 
5. Id. Many publications discuss the early years of cable television. See, e.g., CABLE 
TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE: AN OVERVIEW 5-11 (1972). 
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was insured by generic laws and state regulations controlling ae-
rial construction by "the public utility, with whom [cable televi-
sion] contracts for poles on which to string its cables.'" Safe 
street and utility pole use by cable television was thus insured 
by the same laws and regulations. 
The tendency of some to regard CATV as essentially a pub-
lic utility service was questionable even in the 1950s. For exam-
ple, in a progressive 1956 decision, a unanimous California Su-
preme Court likened cable television to "music halls, theaters, 
and newspapers," and expressly held that cable television is not 
a "telephone corporation or within any other class of utility."'7 
Some federal courts also realized the non-essential non-utility 
status of cable television early on,8 but the issue was in fact 
rarely addressed since cable television served only a small per-
centage of the population and was commonly viewed as merely 
an interim service that would slowly disappear as the broadcast 
networks filled in most service gaps during the 1950s and 1960s.' 
B. The Middle Years: 1970-1975 
Although it became clear during the 1960s that cable televi-
sion would not be displaced by over-the-air, free broadcast tele-
vision, development of the medium was still modest,IO and was 
severely hampered by the fact that it had little to offer other 
than enhancement of broadcast television signals and perhaps 
some supplementation of the number of broadcast stations re-
ceived. ll However, where it did develop in the 1960s, cable tele-
vision required enough of an investment that commercial financ-
ing was needed, and lenders frequently sought greater evidence 
of longevity than an annually renewable permit. Accordingly, 
6. Boulder 11,630 F.2d at 712; Cable Franchise Investigation: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 582 (1981). 
7. Television Transmission v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82, 88-89 (1956). 
8. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 644-65 (N.D. Ohio 
1968), aff'd sub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th 
Cir. 1970). 
9. See HAMBURG, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
10. In 1965, there were only 1,325 operating systems nationwide, with barely over 1 
million total subscribers, or less than 0.5 % of the population. CABLE TELEVISION INFOR-
MATION CENTER, CABLE: AN OVERVIEW 9 (1972). 
11. However, now-repealed FCC restrictions on importation of distant signals se-
verely hampered the ability of cable television through the 19708 to supplement the 
number of stations beyond those available locally. 
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franchise contracts were often executed, and came to be un-
thinkingly accepted as appropriate in the CATV context. 
By 1970, it was the rare community that had no free, off-air 
television at all, and meaningful development of the cable televi-
sion medium thus continued to await development of a product 
available only via cable television.12 Although some unique ser-
vices, such as local origination, were in the experimental stages 
in the early 1970s, the economic downturn in the early 1970s, 
plus a lack of proven consumer demand for any of the experi-
mental services, continued to retard the growth of cable televi-
sion.13 Progress was also hampered by restrictive FCC regula-
tions which were adopted in 1972 in a well-intentioned but 
controversial effort to improve the media through regulation. As 
the Eighth Circuit said in 1978 in striking down one of these 
FCC regulations (the mandatory public access rule for cable tel-
evision), governmental attempts to improve the media offend 
the first amendment.14 The Eighth Circuit stated: 
Regulations like those before us, profoundly alter-
ing the obligations of a private business, requiring 
a fundamental change in its nature, and imposing 
costs on its consumer-subscribers, should be 
based on more than an uncertain trumpet of ex-
pectation alone. In enforcing regulations designed 
by the regulator to make futuristic visions come 
true, courts must proceed with a care propor-
tional to the risk of delivering thereby into the 
regulator'S hands an awesome power. For that 
way may lie not just a totally regulated future, 
unpalatable as that may be to a free people, but a 
government-designed, government-molded, gov-
ernment-packaged future. 
The public interest rubric encourages judicial 
deference to an agency's expertise, not to its pre-
science. Findings may be presumptively correct. 
Not so futuristic guesses. U 
12. See The Role of Congress in Regulating Cable Television and the Potential for 
New Technologies in the Communications System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1090-1091 (1976). 
13. Id. at 1085-86. 
14. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1045, 1053-56 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd 
sub nom. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
15. 571 F.2d at 1045. 
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These comments are even more timely now than they were in 
1978. 
C. The Watershed Years: 1975-1976 
In the 1975-76 period, a dramatic technical breakthrough 
finally enabled cable television to enter urban markets and other 
areas receiving good off-air reception. Due to the advent of satel-
lite technology, cable television at last obtained the capability 
for the unique programming which it needed to emerge as a sig-
nificant member of the media and cultivate urban markets. Af-
ter 1975, program suppliers could use satellites to deliver a wide 
variety of programming to local cable television companies. Each 
local company would set up its own "earth station" in order to 
receive this satellite-delivered programming. Soon, uncut recent 
movies, cultural programs, 24-hour news services, live coverage 
of Congress, sports channels, and other special programming 
quickly became available over cable only, and the medium began 
to grow. This phase of cable television's history, and the impact 
of satellite technology, is set forth in some detail in the Boulder 
trial court's first opinion. Ie 
These emergency programming services represented an ad-
vancing use of existing cable capacity, and did not involve any 
greater intrusion on the public rights-of-way than that which ex-
isted previously. The new services being provided by cablecas-
ters also rendered many older "CATV" decisions (pre-satellite, 
pre-1977 decisions) inapposite to modern cablecasting issues. It 
is now recognized that cable television is no longer properly re-
ferred to as "CATV". Cable television is a first amendment 
speaker which provides neither common carrier nor Bome form 
of essential public utility service; in effect, cable television is an 
"electronic newspaper" which must make editorial decisions re-
garding such matters as program timing, selection, format, and 
marketing. 17 
D. The Emergence of a Medium: The "RFP" Clashes with 
New Realities and New Legal Challenges 
After 1976, cable television's new-found ability to enter ur-
16. Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1036·37. 
17. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 829 (1977). 
5
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ban markets naturally led to efforts to develop those markets. It 
was generally assumed that a given market could only be devel-
oped if the city in question first agreed to a franchise contract. IS 
After 1976, the larger cities were acutely aware of this new inter-
est in their markets, and formal Requests for Proposals (RFP) 
procedures were soon adopted by many of these cities for the 
purpose of receiving and comparing cable television proposals. Ie 
It is no secret that the cable television RFP process became con-
troversial by the late 1970s, as the demands which cities made 
on cable television companies multiplied.20 The RFP process was 
made more controversial because it was calculated to award an 
entire undeveloped market to the single company which would 
offer the city the most.21 As a result, cable television companies 
had little choice but to constantly increase their offers in an at-
tempt to out-bid one another. 
Soon smaller communities with existing cable television sys-
tems, such as Boulder, Colorado, began to envy what larger cit-
ies had exacted from cable television companies. They thus 
adopted RFPs of their own in order to do such things as "ex-
tract some additional concessions"u from companies with ex-
isting contracts, or: replace companies with another which would 
offer more.2S 
18. The word franchise is actually no longer appropriate in the cable television con-
text, if it ever W88. The word "franchise" connotes a "special privilege" for monopoly, 
utility-type service. See, e.g., 12 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 
34.01, at 7 (3d ed. 1970). Cable television is not a utility, Television Transmission, supra 
note 7, and exclusive contracts have been held illegal in most states. See, e.g., TM 
Cablevision v. Daon Corp., No. 15067 (San Diego Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1981), reprinted in 
6 MEDIA LAW REP. (BNA) 2576, 2578 (1981). 
19. The RFP mode was presumably borrowed from procedures used by cities to col-
lect bids for such things 88 new city buildings, vehicle procurement, etc. The "RFP" W88 
thus inappropriate in the cable television context, which involve authorizations to engage 
in a first amendment business rather than city purchases. Still, the RFP mode W88 
adopted when urban markets developed. 
20. See, e.g., J. Marks, Outrageous! How Franchise Documents Have Escalated!, 
TVC MAGAZINE 48 (August 15, 1982) ("cost is getting too great-and too much [is de-
manded] in non-productive 88sets-incredible excess in channel capacity, community 
studios, extra institutional networks and civil giveways. "). One commentator has called 
franchising ordinances "big sticks" on the apparent theory that they can be used by local 
governments to exact concessions from cablecasters and "evade" certain federal and 
state laws. See W. Marticorena, The Cable Television Franchising Ordinance-The 
City's "Big Stick" 25 (article submitted to California League of Cities in 1981). 
21. See, e.g., Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 709-20 (Markey, C.J., dissenting). 
22. Boulder III, 496 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Colo. 1980). 
23. The RFP process is such that the Boulder trial court felt it appropriate to com-
6
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The Boulder case involved a 1979 RFP, and presents a mi-
crocosm of many of the issues involved in subsequent cable tele-
vision cases. Before 1978, a cablecaster in Boulder, Community 
Communications Company (CCC), had provided service to the 
poor reception areas of the City pursuant to a non-exclusive per-
mit. 24 In 1978, CCC started plans to develop the rest of the City 
and bring in satellite delivered programming. In early 1979, CCC 
advised the City of these plans, and the City's initial response 
was enthusiastic. 
In mid-1979, another cable television company advised the 
City of Boulder that it too would like a non-exclusive permit to 
compete with CCC. CCC did not oppose such competitive pro-
posals but instead recognized that competition was possible and 
could not be prevented by law.21i Nonetheless, the City decided 
to adopt an RFP containing numerous demands for additional 
city control and proprietary benefits which could not be ob-
tained through the police power.26 When CCC declined to aban-
don its contract and refused to accept the RFP process, the City 
unilaterally revoked the company's contract, and imposed a new 
contract which contained a moratorium on development work 
which CCC had already started. The moratorium was conced-
edly for the purpose of allowing the City of Boulder to complete 
its RFP selection process. 
CCC did not view the moratorium as valid, and thus filed 
suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, antitrust and first 
amendment claims. The City of Boulder had two primary con-
tentions in response to CCC's antitrust claims: (1) that it is ex-
empt from liability under the antitrust laws; and (2) that even if 
the City cannot invoke state action immunity, its attempts to 
ment at one point: "Stated bluntly, may the City exact tribute for its favor?" Boulder I, 
485 F. Supp. at 1040. 
24. The facts of the Boulder case are set forth in considerable detail in Boulder I, 
Boulder II, and Boulder III. Until the advent 'of satellite-delivered programming, it was 
not economicaly feasible to serve the good-reception areas of Boulder. 
25. Boulder III, 496 F. Supp. at 830. 
26. The City had adopted a contract approach "[aJpparently upon the view that any 
lack of regulatory authority could be finessed by the use of a contract approach . . . ." 
Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1037. Chief Judge Markey described the contract embodied 
within Boulder's RFP to be a "total-control" contract, 630 F.2d at 719, but later RFPs 
are even more demanding, involving many more pages of requirements than just the 22 
pages involved in Boulder. See, e.g., G. SHAPIRO, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CATV 1981 
245-335 (P.L.!. Series, 1981). 
7
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control the cable television market are lawful because cable tele-
vision is a "natural monopoly." The City also contended that: 
(3) cable television, as a "natural monopoly," involves the type 
of "scarcity" that justifies controls similar to those imposed on 
broadcasters by the FCC; and (4) no first amendment issues are 
present if the City does not dictate or interfere with the content 
of CCC's programming. These last two contentions were made in 
response to the first amendment claims in the Boulder case. 
Each of the City's four contentions is flawed, as the record 
of the Boulder case shows. However, variations of each of these 
four contentions continue to be vigorously asserted by local gov-
ernments. It is thus appropriate to examine each position 
separately. 
E. Conventional Antitrust and First Amendment Principles 
Do Apply To Modern Cable Television 
1. There is No Municipal Immunity 
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,17 the 
Supreme Court made it clear that local governments have no an-
titrust immunity of their own. Of course, municipalities can 
cloak themselves with the states' exemption when they imple-
ment an affirmatively expressed, clearly articulated and super-
vised state policy to replace competition in a relevant market 
with some form of monopoly regulation dictated by the state.1I8 
In all other cases, though, cities "must obey the antitrust 
laws."19 
In the Boulder case, the City argued that it was specifically 
authorized by the Colorado Home Rule provisions under which 
it operated to regulate the use of its streets and issue franchises. 
It thus argued that the State of Colorado must have contem-
plated that Boulder might adopt a cable television RFP and 
award the market to only one company. From this argument the 
City concluded that it was entitled to state action immunity 
under the rationale of City of Lafayette. 
As the Supreme Court pointed out, such an argument to-
27. 435 U.S. 389, 410-13 (1978). 
28. Id. at 410-13. 
29. Id. at 416. 
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tally misconceives what the High Court means when it says that 
a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed, and actively super-
vised state policy is required before a city can avail itself of the 
state's exemption from federal antitrust laws. Not any affirma-
tive state policy will do; the affirmative state policy must actu-
ally replace competition in a given market with some form of 
comprehensive, monopoly regulatory mode which the state has 
outlined or fashioned.30 As the Boulder Court noted, a general 
state authorization can never suffice.31 
In other words, if state law appears indifferent as to 
whether or not competition is displaced in a given market, there 
can be no antitrust immunity. As one commentator has stated, 
"the possibility that two cities could adopt opposite policies con-
sistent with the same state authorization dooms the claims for 
immunity under Boulder."32 Were the rule otherwise, cities 
could "make economic choices counseled solely by their own pa-
rochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive ef-
fects,"33 and this is exactly what Boulder and City of Lafayette 
forbid. 
With regard to cable television, some cities have argued that 
Boulder does not apply in states such as California, which have 
a statute authorizing cities to enter into contracts with cable tel-
evision companies." However, such statutes are nothing more 
than general authorizations to enter into almost any type of con-
tractual arrangement imaginable, or not to enter into such con-
tracts, as each city wishes. Such state neutrality on the subject 
falls short of a clear, affirmatively expressed state policy to dis-
place competition in the cable television market, and even 
before Boulder, district courts in the Ninth Circuit so ruled.311 
30. [d. at 413; Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1981). 
31. Boulder V, 455 U.S. at 54-56. 
32. Municipal Antitrust Liability, Prospects After the Boulder Case, FED. CITY 
RPTR. at 6 (February 5, 1982). 
33. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408. 
34. California has such a provision in its government code. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 
53066 (West 1982). 
35. See, e.g., Televants, Inc. v. City of Martinez, No. C 81-2376 TEH (N.D. Cal., 
Oct. 23, 1981) (Order denying defendants' Motion to Dismiss because "neither the pa-
pers nor the oral arguments of defendants establish that California Government Code §§ 
53066 and 53066.1 clearly articulate a state policy to displace competition in cable televi-
sion." [d. at 2); LibertY,Communications, Inc. v. Washington County, Civ. No. SO-471-PA 
9
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Since attempts by municipal leagues to have the California Leg-
islature adopt legislation replacing competition with a state plan 
for monopoly regulation of cable television have failed, it is all 
the more clear that Boulder-type immunity arguments must fail 
in states like California.86 
It is also self-evident that Boulder requires a valid state 
policy before any state action immunity can arise.87 This recog-
nizes that there are constitutional limits on exercises of state po-
lice power. For example, any state (or even congressional) policy 
to displace competition among first amendment disseminators 
would violate the first amendment, and thus be invalid, no mat-
ter how clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed or actively 
supervised.88 
2. Cable Television is Not a "Natural Monopoly" 
The City of Boulder also argued strenuously that cable tele-
vision is a natural monopoly. Therefore-even though it was 
clearly preventing competition-the city contended that its at-
tempts to control a natural monopoly were lawful. 
The natural monopoly assertion is, of course, an assertion of 
fact, to which Chief Judge Markey responded: 
On appeal, the city's sole defense is to pretend, 
disingenuously and contrary to the extensive, un-
contradicted testimony and the specific findings 
of the trial judge, and contrary to its own City At-
(D. Ore., Sept. 23, 1980) (Consent Decree and Final Judgment entered after preliminary 
injunction issued against county). 
36. The California Legislature did introduce a bill, AB 3130, with the view that it 
might be adequate to confer antitrust immunity, but AB 3130 was not enacted. At hear-
ings on AB 3130 though, the City Attorney for the City of Torrance, representing the 
League of California Cities and the "view of really all city attorneys who have studied 
cable television," testified correctly "that Section 53066 of the Government Code is inad-
equate" to confer antitrust immunity because "it is neutral" and "not a clearly articu-
lated, affirmatively expressed state policy as it now exists." Special Joint Hearing of 
Subcommittee on Cable Television and Assembly, Local Government Committee, Local 
Government Franchising and Regulation of Cable TV in California after Boulder and 
AB 3130, 1982 Spec. Sess. 49-50 (1982) (statement of Stanley Remelmeyer, City Attorney 
for the City of Torrance, California). 
37. See Brief for Petitioner at 35 n.19, Community Communications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, 445 U.S. 40 (1982). 
38. See, e.g., Transcript of Special Joint Hearing of Subcommittee on Cable Televi-
sion and Assembly Local Government Committee, supra note 36, at 29-32. 
10
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torney's advice, that cable is a "natural monop-
oly." The city's sole argument in this case is that 
because there can be only one cable operator in 
Boulder, the moratorium was necessary to pre-
vent CCC from "wiring the entire city" before the 
city could conduct its bid process and select what 
it considered the "best" company to enjoy that 
monopoly. Not to put too fine a point on it, that 
argument is today simply fallacious. As the trial 
judge found, and as the record makes clear, mod-
ern technology makes free and open competition 
both practically and economically available to the 
city by at least four competing cable 
communicators.88 
133 
Moreover, cable television is increasingly subject to vigorous 
competition from other suppliers of video news, information, 
and entertainment, none of whom are burdened by the demands 
which cities are now making of cable television.40 
More importantly, the "thin market" argument is flawed 
from a legal standpoint.41 First, since cable television is not a 
utility, those courts which discuss the natural monopoly concept 
as if cable television was a utility have failed to recognize the 
true nature of this emerging member of the media.42 Second, in 
39. Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 712. 
40. STV (coded UHF signal pay TV), MDS (microwave distributed pay TV), DBS 
(Direct Broadcast Satellite pay TV), master antenna system, SMATV (satellite), video 
cassettes and video disks constitute just some of the competing services now available. 
See, e.g., Fielding Competition: Beware of the Growing List of Competition, CABLEVI-
SION 23 (May 17, 1982). 
41. It is preferable to use the less pejorative phrase "thin market" to describe the 
so-called "natural monopoly" situation. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 45, at 115 (1977). 
42. A recent Seventh Circuit case illustrates this point. See Omega Satellite Prod. v. 
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982). Although dealing with a satellite pay 
service which "compete[s) with cable television systems" rather than cable television it-
self," id. at 121, the court considered the natural monopoly defense in dictum because 
Omega had applied for a permit to make some use of the public ways. After reviewing 
principles of "public utility franchising," plus various gas, telephone and other utility 
and common carrier cases, the Omega court speculated that a natural monopoly argu-
ment might justify some form of government control over such a market, although the 
scope such controls could lawfully assume can only be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis after factual findings at trial. [d. at 125-27. However, once it is more widely recog-
nized that cable television is a member of the media and not a utility, it is doubtful that 
courts will adopt the Omega rationale. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of 
New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960) (in non-utility context, competitive 
market forces must be allowed to operate). 
11
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non-utility contexts, the natural monopoly cases have never 
stood for the proposition that, outside the utility or common 
carrier context, government can predetermine whether a market 
is a thin market, or select who the one supplier will be in a thin 
market.43 This is particularly true when first amendment busi-
nesses are involved.44 It thus appears that municipalities have no 
viable defense to section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims, 
especially when contractual relationships are involved, which au-
tomatically satisfies section l's two-actor requirement.46 
3. Novel First Amendment Issues and Misconceptions 
About "Scarcity" 
Once cable television's first amendment character is ac-
knowledged, it is quite apparent that first amendment issues are 
raised by any procedure which excludes one member of the me-
dia from a market in order to give the market to another com~ 
pany that would pay the city more. In the Boulder case, the City 
responded to these concerns by adopting a position which was 
an extension of its natural monopoly argument. 
In essence, Boulder argued that there are two types of me-
dia: over-the-air broadcasters and print media.46 It was also as-
43. As the cablecaster in the Boulder case argued to the Supreme Court, "The City 
essentially argues that it should be allowed to determine in advance that a market is a 
thin market, and then should be allowed to designate the monopolist. Both actions 
would be illegal under the antitrust laws. Whether a thin market exists can only be de-
termined by the free play of competitive forces. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspa-
pers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960). Even if a municipal predetermi-
nation of thin market status was not illegal, the City still could not designate a 
monopolist. The antitrust laws require that an 'elimination bout' determine who the sup-
plier shall be in a thin market, which cable television is not. ld. at 584 n.4." Brief for 
petitioner at 13 n.4, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40 
(1982). In the utility context, of course, states have often displaced competition with 
monopoly regulation, but in exchange have also guaranteed the utilities a reasonable rate 
of return on their investments-a guarantee which is not extended by regulation to the 
non-utility business of cable television. See, e.g., Orange County Cable Communications 
Co. v. City of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1976). 
44. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d at 
584; Omega Satellite Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d at 128 "([it] should be noted 
that while today most newspaper markets are natural monopolies, no one thinks that 
entry into those markets could be regulated without creating profound First Amendment 
problems"). 
45. See Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1039, citing Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Boulder ll, 630 F.2d at 714-15. 
46. See Brief for Appellant, at 31-50, Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City 
of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981). 
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serted that different first amendment standards apply to each.4? 
The City then argued that cable television was more like broad-
casting than the print media because both broadcasters and 
cable television involve scarcity situations. The City thus con-
cluded that it could lawfully control cable television in all the 
ways the FCC can control broadcasters. 
The City's position seriously misconstrues what is meant by 
the term "scarcity" in the broadcast context. It is true that the 
electromagnetic spectrum is limited and that no two broadcast-
ers can occupy the same space on the spectrum and transmit 
properly. This physical scarcity limitation justifies a system 
whereby the FCC allocates licenses to broadcasters.48 However, 
all courts apparently agree that this physical scarcity problem 
does not exist with regard to cable television, which uses discrete 
cables rather than the air waves.49 As the District of Columbia 
Circuit noted: "The First Amendment theory espoused in [the 
broadcasting cases] . . . cannot be directly applied to cable tele-
vision since an essential precondition of that theory-physical 
interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for govern-
ment-is absent."lIo Some have argued that economic scarcity 
(i.e., the possibility that a market can support only one supplier) 
should also justify government intervention and control of first 
amendment disseminators, but this argument has been expressly 
rejected with regard to both the print media and cable 
television. III 
In the Boulder case, however, the Tenth Circuit coined the 
47. The City, however, failed to recognize that, even though "[e]ach method [of 
communication] tends to present its own peculiar problems ... the basic principles of 
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. 
Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom 
of expression the rule." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). 
48. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 
(1973). 
49. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 713. 
50. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 44-45. 
51. "[S]carcity which is the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insuf-
ficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of 
the conventional press, . . . and there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a 
constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this point." Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 46, citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241, 247-56 (1974). 
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phrase "media scarcity" to describe a situation analogous to eco-
nomic scarcity.1I2 The Tenth Circuit then speculated that, if me-
dia scarcity existed in a community, the local government might 
be justified in selecting the one member of the media it deemed 
"best." As a legal proposition, the Tenth Circuit's media scarcity 
rationale is indistinguishable from earlier economic scarcity ar-
guments, is thus untenable, and has been criticized by commen-
tators. liS Moreover, upon remand for findings of fact, the Boul-
der trial court approved stipulated findings of fact which are 
directly contrary to the factual suppositions the Tenth Circuit 
adopted in support of its media scarcity rationale.1I4 
52. Boulder IV, 660 F.2d at 1378. 
53. See, e.g., Note, Access to Cable Television: A Critique of the Affirmative Duty 
Theory of the First Amendment, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1393, 1406-07 (1982). See also an 
exhaustive article by Professor William Lee, entitled Cable Franchising and the First 
Amendment, which will appear in a 1983 edition of VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW. It is possi-
ble that the Tenth Circuit's position would conflict with the Supreme Court's recent 
admonition that "differential treatment" of first amendment disseminators presump-
tively violates the first amendment. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
Comm'r of Revenue, 51 U.S.L.W. 4315 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1983) (No. 81-1839). Most cable 
television RFP's and contracts treat cablecasters differentially and do not seek the least 
restrictive means of achieving any legitimate, compelling governmental interest which 
may exist. 
54. On October 29, 1982, a stipulation and final judgment was approved and filed by 
the trial court. The trial court expressly found that the following stipulations of fact 
were supported by the evidence presented during several days of hearings on the two 
preliminary injunctions which had been entered in the case: 
[Finding No.3) CCC is a cable television company, and is thus 
a publisher of news, information and entertainment which it 
sometimes originates, and also selects or obtains from a vari-
ety of sources. Material published by CCC shall not be consid-
ered commercial speech. Although CCC may, incident to its 
dissemination activities, publish some advertising, CCC's pre-
dominant activity is the publication of protected, noncommer-
cial speech. 
[Finding No.4) The cable television medium differs greatly 
from the broadcast medium. The physical scarcity problems 
associated with wireless use of the electromagnetic broadcast 
spectrum do not exist in connection with cable television, thus 
removing, as a practical matter, technological limitations on 
the number of cablecasters that can co-exist in the City. 
[Finding No.5) CCC is a First Amendment disseminator, and 
not a broadcaster, and is entitled to the protections of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
[Finding No.6) Competition among more than one cablecaster 
in the City is economically possible. 
Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, Civ. Action No. 8O-M-62, 5-6 
(D. Colo. Oct. 29, 1982) (Stipulation and Judgment). 
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It is thus apparent that governmental attempts to control 
cable television should be judged by the established first amend-
ment standards which apply to all other non-broadcast members 
of the media. 
4. Content-Based Regulation is Not Lawful 
One last area of confusion deserves mention. In Boulder, the 
cable caster contended that the City's actions had been based on 
considerations related to the content of the cablecaster's dissem-
ination, and thus ran afoul of the absolute prohibition on con-
tent-based restrictions.1III In response, the City stated that, since 
it was not dictating the actual content of programming, its ac-
tions were not content-based. 
The City's position misunderstands the scope of the term 
"content" in the first amendment context. In addition to the 
substantive message being conveyed, the "content" of first 
amendment activity includes such things as the "form" of ex-
pressionjlls any "layout" or format involvedjll7 the "size" or 
amount of space devoted to expressionjll8 the number of chan-
nels provided,1I9 and so forth. Thus, any selection process which 
is based on a comparison of such "content," or dictates stan-
dards regarding such "content" (as all cable television RFPs do), 
is content-based.so 
This would be true even if the first amendment dissemina-
tor is "not prevented . . . from saying anything it wishes. "SI 
Choices are still being made on the basis of content, selections 
are being made on the basis of the identity of the speakers and 
what they propose to disseminate, and content is being influ-
55. Use of the word "restriction" rather than "regulation" is intentional. Cable tele-
vision cases such as Boulder typically involve restrictions imposed by contract-ordi-
nances which must be accepted in writing, rather than any form of police power regula-
tion. See, e.g., Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 714-15. 
56. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
57. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 391 
(1973). 
58. See, e.g., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 257-58 & n.22. 
59. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1056. 
60. See, e.g., Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1053 (mandatory "public access" channel 
rules were content-based even though the substantive message was not regulated); 
Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 253-58. 
61. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256. 
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enced as a result. Since any government-imposed restriction 
which is content-based violates the first amendment,62 the RFP 
procedures now being pursued by some cities raise serious first 
amendment concerns.68 
CONCLUSION 
Cable television is a somewhat misunderstood medium. As 
the federal courts continue to deal with important questions re-
lated to cable television, it will be increasingly necessary to ex-
plore such factual issues as the nature of the medium, the nature 
of the relevant market, and the effects of various mandatory 
contractual controls which local governments have proposed.84 
Such inquiries, it can be hoped, will facilitate both a better un-
derstanding of the media, and a wider application of legal stan-
dards which have been long-accepted in other contexts. 
62. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Services Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 
536-38 (1980). The Tenth Circuit in the Boulder case agreed that, where such content-
based restrictions develop, "a significant First Amendment isaue" is presented. 660 F.2d 
at 1377 n.6. 
63. Local government may sincerely feel that it would never use control of cable 
television to control the measage being disseminated, but in reality government control 
of the media leads inevitably to control of the measage. For example, some cable televi-
sion companies are now hiring their own investigative reporters and camera crews, and 
covering local news. However, when one city manager heard of such a proposal, his reac-
tion was as follows: 
"I'm not sure if I'd have minicameras running around inter-
viewing people on the street .... They can ask their neigh-
bor if they want to know what they think . . . . What I'm 
talking about is quality programming. . . with good direction 
and control .... [S)ome guy giving you his opinion about a 
war, [or) what a local City Councilman does with a cameraman 
sticking a camera in his face ... that is not of interest .... n 
Transcript of Contra Costa County Cable Television Hearings, at 20, line 21 to p. 21, line 
16 (February 10, 1982, Contra Costa County, California). With this degree of concern 
over the content and "quality" of programming, and with the apparent reluctance to 
have city officials exposed to a probing local news media, one must ask whether govern-
ment influences over the mesaage can be far behind? 
64. Cities often ask courts to asaume these disputed factual isaues can be resolved in 
a way that supports the RFP procesa, and thus move for a dismisaal of cablecasters 
complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal courts 
have correctly recognized that such dismisaala are inappropriate. See, e.g., Televents, 
Inc. v. City of Martinez, supra note 35. 
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